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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on 
economie activity and employtnent by means of various stylized 
verslons of main-stream macro-economie policy models for the 
Netherlands. The simulations of this paper illustrate the working 
and quantitative importance of a number of mechanisms, which play 
a major role in modern textbook macro-economics, such as crowding 
out, Ricardian equivalence, accommodating versus non-accommoda-
ting monetary policy, exchange rate policy and its reputation 
effects. It appears that the size and even the sign of the 
effects strongly depend on the way the economy has been modelled. 
Crucial parameter values are important in this respect, but more 
so differences in model specification which mirror differences in 
interpretation and in theoretical thinking on how the economy 
works. Yet, according to our simulations, fiscal and monetary 
policy is not very effective in enhancing total income and 
employment. As compared to other policy measures exchange rate 
policy is shown to yield relatively large effects. 
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1. Introduction» 
The analysis of the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on 
economie activity, and hence on the labour market, is at the core 
of macroeconomic theory. Standard textbook theory shows how 
fiscal policy leads to a shift of the IS-curve and monetary 
policy to a shift of the LM-curve. Open economy macroeconomics 
adds a BP-curve to this diagram. Under fixed exchange rates and 
high capital mobility, a simple rule says that monetary policy 
will achieve external balance and fiscal policy will achieve full 
employment. When exchange rates are flexible and capital is very 
mobile, fiscal policy becomes totally ineffective in changing 
real economie activity, but monetary policy retains it effective-
ness. In this context various versions of the Mundell-Flemming 
model predict the impact of monetary and fiscal policy on 
internal and external equilibrium in case of either flexible or 
fixed exchange rates (see e.g. Parkin and Bade, 1982, pp. 317-
338; Frenkel and Razin, 1987). 
In policy practice, however, things are less clear cut than these 
simple theoretical models suggest. This paper intermediates 
between policy practice and macroeconomic theory by analyzing the 
impact of fiscal and monetary policy on economie activity and 
employment using stylized versions of empirical macroeconomic 
policy models for the Netherlands. These stylized models reflect 
the main characteristics of the models which are used in actual 
policy, but are at the same time flexible enough as to illustrate 
how the alternative assumptions on which theory focusses may 
affect the working of the models. 
The next section shortly introduces the models used in the 
simulations of this study, and indicates their relationship with 
the actual Dutch policy models. Section 3 gives the transmission 
channels of fiscal and monetary policy in these models. Sections 
4 to 8 show the differences in working of the various models by 
simulating monetary and fiscal policy under alternative condi-
tions. Section 4 discusses the crowding-out argument for a 
policy of fiscal restraint which reduces the financial deficit of 
the government. Section 5 illustrates how the occurrence of so 
called Ricardian equivalence may make this policy of fiscal 
restraint more effective. Section 6 considers the case that the 
policy of fiscal restraint is accompanied by non accommodating 
monetary policy. Section 7 illustrates the effects of a money 
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eupply policy whereas section 8 focusses on exchange rate policy. 
Section 9 finally discusees, against the background of the 
simulation results of this paper, the scope for actual monetary 
and fiscal policy in the Netherlands to enhance economie activity 
and employment. 
2. Stvlized policy models. 
The Netherlands have a long standing tradition in the use of 
macroeconomic models in policy analysis. The results of policy 
simulations made with models are not only discussed by government 
experts and by academies, but also amply in Parliament and press. 
These results carry a large weight in the design of macroeconomic 
policy. Three generations of policy models may be distinguished. 
(See Chapter 2 of Den Butter, 1987). Model based macroeconomic 
policy analysis was for a long time almost the Dutch Central 
Planning Bureau's monopoly. In the fifties and sixties, years of 
prosperous economie growth and nearly f uil employment, this 
Bureau used short term demand determined Reynesian models. The 
purpose of the models was cyclical analysis. At the beginning of 
the seventies a second generation of models substituted the first 
generation. This new generation endogenizes the supply side of 
the economy, using a vintage approach for modelling productive 
capacity and labour demand. The third generation of models was 
built at the beginning of the eighties. These models comprise a 
fully fledged description of the monetary sector. Moreover in 
these years a proliferation of the use of macro models for policy 
purposes has taken place. The Central Planning Bureau lost its 
monopoly in this field as other Government Agencies, the Central 
Bank and Research Institutes at Universities started to use their 
own models for policy advice. 
The changing of the generations of models has played an important 
part in the model based policy analysis in the Netherlands. The 
formation of the Lubbers-I Cabinet in 1982 marks a main turning 
point in this respect. At September 15, on behalf of the 
formation of the Cabinet, the Presidium of the Central Economie 
Commission (CEC) published a memorandum which surveyed economie 
developments and the consequences of a number of policy measures 
for the next period of government. The various scenarios of this 
memorandum are calculated by the Central Planning Bureau's new 
FREIA model which on this occasion made its first public 
appearance. Especially Chart 1 in this memorandum has had a large 
impact on the proposals for economie policy in the so called 
"government agreement" of the Lubbers-I Cabinet. This chart 
illustrates the mechanism that a policy of reducing the govern-
ment deficit by less government expenditure will in the short run 
lead to less private expenditure and employment, but will in the 
long run have favourable effects on the economy because of 
reversed crowding out effects. Quite remarkably, at the moment of 
publication of the CEC memorandum nobody outside the Central 
Planning Bureau knew about the FREIA model. It was more than a 
year later, in November 1983, that the Central Planning Bureau 
published a monograph with an extensive description of the FREIA 
model. However, according to the simulations in this monograph, a 
reduction of government expenditure does not lead to such turn 
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from an unfavourable to a favourable effect as shown by the 
simulations of the CEC memorandum. Most probably the simulatione 
of the CEC memorandum are based on a number of supplementary 
assumptions. 
The simulations of the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in 
this paper are made with own verslons of a quarterly model for 
the Netherlands, which incorporate as much as possible the main 
characteristics and mechanisms of the three generations of Dutch 
policy models. In fact, we consider two models, named Mod CS and 
Mod CSM (C - cycle, S » structure and M - monetary), as starting 
point for the simulations. Mod CS, representing the second 
generation of policy models, adds a supply side block determining 
productive capacity and labour demand to a first generation 
demand-determined Keynesian model. Mod CSM extends Mod CS with a 
number of behavloural equations and identities from the monetary 
sector. As such this model represents the third and present 
generation of Dutch policy models. 
Instead of comparing the results of existing models we use own 
versions of the models mainly because these models are stylized 
and consequently do not contain as much detail as the proper 
policy models. Hence they allow us to concentrate on those 
changes in the specifications of the models which lead to a major 
change in the working of the models. 
Table 1. Content of the models. 
Model equations 
Mod CS - consumption function 
- investment equation 
- export equation 
- import equation 
- stock building 
- definition of income 
- demand for money function 
- wage and price equations 
- inflationary expectations formation 
- productive capacity and labour demand 
determined by quasi vintage approach 
- labour supply equation 
Mod CSM - Mod CS plus 
- equation for net foreign capital market transac-
tions of the private sector 
- balance of payments identity 
- technical equation for interest 
, payments by the government 
- budget restriction of the government 
- demand for credit equation 
- macroeconomic budget restriction 
- interest equation 
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the models used 
here. The annex contains a formal definition of the models and 
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their equations. It also comprises a list of symbols. The 
specifications of the equations of the models and the selected 
values of their coefficients are, for a major part, based on the 
empirical literature. In this selection process the outcomes of 
the Dutch policy models have played a prominent part. Hence, the 
coefficients are deliberately not determined by estimation. Our 
procedure aims at exploiting as much as possible the empirical 
knowledge on the Dutch economy obtained in the course of time• Of 
course, selecting specifications of equations and values of 
coefficients from the literature is rather arbitrary. Yet, in our 
opinion, such a compilation of empirical knowledge exploits much 
more information than a respecification and re-estimation of 
behavioural relationships that have extensively been studied 
before. Moreover, experience tells that a re-estimation of 
traditional macroeconomic behavioural equations always needs a 
look at other empirical evidence in order to obtain plausible 
estimates. 
After the selection of the specifications of the equations and 
the values of the coefficients, the performance of the models to 
describe the past is tested by a dynamic simulation over the 
period 1973 - 1986. The results of these dynamic simulations 
appear to be most satisfactory, the more so as none of these 
models contains dummy-variables which comply with specific events 
as is common use in actual policy models. For more detail and 
information on the selected models and for references to the 
literature we refer to Den Butter (1987, 1989). 
3. Policy transmission channels. 
The stylized models of this paper comprise the main transmission 
channels of fiscal and monetary policy which are also at work in 
the policy models. With respect to fiscal policy these channels 
are: 
government expenditure as an autonomous part of real income 
(eq. lh of the annex). 
tax receipts of the government which determine disposable 
income (eq. 1i). 
the burden of taxation which influences price and wage 
formation representing the effects of tax evasion (eq. 3a and 
3b). 
(in Mod CSM) the government budget constraint (eq. 8a) 
including the endogenous interest payments on government 
debt (eq. 9f). 
In combination with the macroeconomic budget restriction (eq. 
9k), according to which the financial surplusses and deficits of 
the private, public and foreign sectors sum to zero, the 
government budget constraint also forms the main link in the 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. 
Monetary policy is modelled to be transmitted through: 
the real interest rate as a determinant of the volumes of 
consumption and investment (eq. la and lb). 
the real money stock as a determinant of the volumes of 
consumption and investment (eq. la and lb), representing the 
effects of real wealth or of monetary ease (e.g. availability 
of credit) in the respective expenditure equations. 
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the real interest rate as a determinant of the scrapping of 
obsolete capital stock (eq. 51); thls transmlsslon channel 
has not been built into the actual policy models but is 
reminiscent of Malcomson's (1975) scrapping condition which 
holds under imperfect competition; its quantitative in-
fluence, however, appears to be rather limited (see Den 
Butter, 1977). 
the exchange rate which, via import prices (eq. 7a), is a 
determinant of the volumes of imports and exports (eq. lf and 
Ie), representing the influence of the competitive position; 
the exchange rate influences domestic prices as a cost 
factor (eq. 3a). 
The latter channels are direct channels of exchange rate policy. 
The exchange rate, or to be more precise, exchange rate expecta-
tions, also have an indirect influence on the real economie 
sector through monetary transmlsslon as they are determinant of 
the (nominal) interest rate (eq. 10a) and the foreign capital 
transactions of the private sector (eq. 9c). 
4. Fiscal policy and crowdlng out. 
This paper's simulations of the effects of fiscal policy on 
economie activity and on the labour market focus on the policy of 
restraint by reducing government spending. Hence, this paper pays 
no attention to tax rate8 as an instrument of fiscal policy (see 
Den Butter and Compaijen, 1989, for simulations wlth respect to 
taxation and social security contributions in similar models). 
The policy of fiscal restraint is simulated by means of a 
permanent and autonomous reduction of government expenditure by 
1Z of national income. Each simulation is run over a period of 24 
quarters (6 years). The baseline projection is based on the 
values of the exogenous variables in the fourth quarter of 1986. 
The reduction of government expenditure starts in the first 
quarter of the simulation period. The effects of the impulses are 
measured as differences from the baseline projections. In each 
behavioural equation the constant term is set equal to its mean 
value in the reference period, given the selected values of the 
coefficients. 
Table 2 gives the results of the simulations of fiscal restraint 
according to the representatives of the second and third 
generatlons of Dutch policy models, Mod CS and Mod CSM. The alm 
of these simulations is to investigate whether the working of the 
third generation model differs from that of the second generation 
model wlth respect to the crowdlng out argument. As mentioned in 
section 2 the first FREIA-simulations suggest such a difference 
in working. 
The results for Mod CS presented in the left hand part of table 2 
illustrate that the expenditure policy leads to the desired 
reduction of the government deficit indeed. However, over the 
whole simulation period, total expenditure remains below the 
baseline Ievel. Demand for labour decreases somewhat and hence 
unemployment increases. The Phillips-curve effect induces a 
slight reduction of wages. Prices do not deviate from baseline 
Ievel, because the opposite effects of the decrease of the 
utilization rate of capital goods and of the decrease of labour 
productivity compensate each other in the price equation. The 
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reduction of the utilization rate of capital goods and the fall 
of total demand have a negative effect on the volume of imports. 
As the volume of exports remains almost unaltered, the expendi-
ture policy causes a surplus on the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
The right hand part of table 2 shows that the effects of the 
expenditure policy in Mod CSM hardly dlffer from the effects in 
Mod CS discussed above. This is remarkable as no substantial 
"crowding in" of private expenditure appears to result from this 
policy. As a matter of fact the simulations with Mod CSM show no 
turn from unfavourable to favourable effects, not even in the 
long run. In conformity with "crowding in" theory the govemment 
needs less debt financing due to the reduction of its deficit. 
However, this results in a very small decrease of the long term 
interest rate only. Investment is hardly affected by this 
decrease. In this respect we note that the reduction of the 
government deficit results in a decrease of the financial surplus 
of the private sector as well. The improvement of the balance of 
payments appears not to be sufficiënt for neutralizing this 
effect. Therefore capital market financing by the private sector 
increases1, which somewhat reduces the downward pressure on the 
interest rate caused by the decreased capital financing of the 
government. Yet, the effect of the policy of reducing government 
expenditure on the government deficit appears in the end to be 
somewhat larger in Mod CSM than in both other models. This is due 
to the interest payments of the government which are endogenous 
in Mod CSM. This part of government expenditure deminishes 
somewhat as a result of the lower deficit and the fall in the 
interest rate. 
Table 2. The effects of an autonomous reduction of government expenditure 
of 1Z of national income. 
(in X of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
on according to Mod CS Mod CSM 
(second generation) (third generation) 
af ter lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
Volume of income -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
Volume of private consuraption -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
Volume of investments -0.9 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 
Price level -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Wage level -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 
Demand for labour -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Money stock (deflated) -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 
Unemployment (in lab. years xlOOO) 3 7 3 5 3 7 3 5 
Surplus current account (in ï NI) 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8j 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Fin. deficit govemment (ir. Z NI) -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 
Interest rate (ï-points) 
- - - -
-0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
All in all these simulations show that according to Mod CSM the 
"crowding in" effect is of no quantitative importance. Hence the 
extension of Dutch policy models with a submodel of the monetary 
sector appears not to provide a strong argument for the policy of 
reducing government expenditure. The two chains in the crowding 
out mechanism, namely the interest rate sensitivity of invest-
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ment and the influence of capital market financing by the 
government on the long term interest rate, are to weak as to 
make this argument of quantitative importance. This is not only 
true for the stylized third generation model Mod CSM used here, 
but in fact for most Dutch third generation models which are 
actually used in policy analysis. (see e.g. table 6.8 in De 
Nederlandsche Bank, 1985; table 5.6 in Kuipers et al.. 1988; 
table 5.4 in Centraal Planbureau, 1983; table 4 in Okker, 1988; 
and table 9 in Den Butter, 1988). 
Table 3. The effects of an autonomous reductlon of government expenditure 
of 1Z of national income. 
(in Z of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
on according to Mod CSM Mad CSM Mod CSM Mod CSM 
(third generation, (idem, quadrupling (idem, quadrupling (idem, exogenous 
quadrupling int. infl. cap. market fin. of both int. payments of 
rate elast.inv.) on interest rate) coefficients) government) 
af ter lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
Volume of income -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 
Volume of private consumption -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.0 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.9 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 0.3 
Volume of investments -0.9 -0.0 0.1 0.6 -0.8 -0.1 0.1 0.8 -0.8 0.7 2.0 5.1 -0.8 0.6 1.2 2.3 
Price level -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Wage level -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 
Demand for labour -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.1 
Money stock (deflated) -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.5 1.3 -1.4 -1.5 -1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.8 
Unemployroent (in lab. years xlOOO) 3 7 1 2 3 7 3 6 3 6 -0 -6 3 6 0 -2 
Surplus current account (in 'l NI) 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 
Fin. deficit government (in % NI) -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.6 -0.9 -1.0 -1.4 -2.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 
Interest rate (I-points) 1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 
This result makes it an interesting question for what value of, 
on the one hand, the influence of the interest rate on investment 
and, on the other hand, the influence of capital market financing 
on the interest rate, this mechanism, in fact, describes the 
alleged turn from an unfavourable to a favourable effect. Table 3 
presents the results of such sensitivity analysis. Although the 
interest rate and/or capital costs appear as explanatory 
variables in the expenditure equations in almost all macro-
economie models, the estimated negative influence of these 
variables proves to be rather small. The basis variant of the 
models used here assumes a long-term elasticity of the real 
interest rate with respect to investment of -0.1. The influence 
of capital financing and especially of the government deficit on 
the long term interest rate has recently obtained much empirical 
attention (See e.g. Acx and De Vijlder, 1985, Bovenberg, 1987, 
Evans, 1987a, 1987b, Feldstein, 1986, Hoelscher, 1986, Naudts and 
Schokkaert, 1988, Van Sinderen, 1982, Zahid, 1988, Tanzi, 1985, 
with a reaction by Spiro, 1987, and a reply by Tanzi, 1987). None 
of these studies measures a large influence of the deficit on the 
interest rate. Most certainly not in the case of small open 
economies such as the Netherlands where the domestic interest 
rates are, to a large extent, determined by the foreign interest 
rates. Van Loo (1984) surveys a number of empirical results for 
the Netherlands. With reference to this survey the basis variant 
of the models used here assumes that a reduction of capital 
market financing by the government by the amount of 1 Z of 
national income leads to a fall of the interest rates of 0.25 Z-
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points. The corresponding coëfficiënt vith respect to private 
sector capital market financing is set to the same value (eq. 
10a). 
The sensitivity analysis investigates a quadrupling of these 
coefficients, first one by one, and then both. The first part of 
table 3 gives the effects of the expenditure policy according to 
the variant of Mod GSM in which the interest rate elasticity of 
investment has been quadrupled and hence has obtained a long 
term value of -0.4. The outcomes of this simulation appear to be 
hardly different from those of the basis variant. Like in the 
basis variant the reduction of expenditure leads to a fall in 
demand, also in the long run, and the negative effect on 
unemployment is almost as large as in the basis variant. Yet, the 
decreased interest rate induces investment to level with the 
baseline in spite of the fall in demand. 
The next variant has the influence of capital market financing on 
the interest rate quadrupled. This variant assumes that a 
reduction of capital market financing to the amount of 1 X of 
national income causes the interest rate to fall with 1 %-
points; this influence is notably larger than measured in the 
empirical studies surveyed by Van Loo. The simulation results in 
the second part of table 3 show that in this case the reduction 
of government expenditure indeed leads to a substantial fall of 
the interest rate. However, this fall has hardly any effect on 
total expenditure and on demand for labour. 
The third part of table 3 gives the simulation results for the 
variant of Mod CSM in which the size of both chains in the 
crowding out mechanism has been quadrupled. In this case, with 
the interest payments of the government acting as a fly-wheel, 
the fall of the interest rate and the reduction of the government 
deficit appear to interfere in such a way that at the end of the 
simulation period of six years total expenditure and labour 
demand are again at the level of the baseline. Investments 
constitute the engine for this turn of effects. Yet, even 
according to this variant in which the relevant coefficients have 
obtained values, which are hardly realistic, the reduction in 
government expenditure does not lead to more labour demand. It 
corroborates the conclusion drawn before that the "crowding in" 
mechanism does, in this respect, not provide empirical support 
for the policy of reducing public expenditure. 
The alleged influence of the interest payments by the government 
has played a major role in the discussions on the policy of 
government expenditure in the Netherlands (see e.g. Wellink, 
1987a, 1987b, and for a different opinion, Van Muiswinkel, 1985). 
In order to investigate this influence the last part of table 3 
gives the results of the expenditure policy according to a 
variant of Mod CSM in which the relevant coefficients are 
quadrupled as in the previous variant but in which the interest 
payments by the government are assumed exogenous. A comparison 
of the results according to this and the previous variant shows 
that the interaction between the fall in interest rates and the 
size of the interest payments is of such an order of magnitude 
that the final effect of a reduction in expenditure on the 
financial deficit and on the long term interest rate is more than 
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doubled by this interaction. Thus, in case the "crowding in" 
effect via the interest rate mechanism would be of quantitative 
importance, the interest payments by the government would 
constitute an important chain in this mechanism. 
5. Fiscal policy and Ricardian equlvalence. 
The simulations of the preceding section only consider the 
reversal of the crowding out effects by means of the interest 
rate mechanism. However, in the recent literature there has been 
much debate about the neutrality of government debt. This 
neutrality proposition or Ricardian equlvalence implies that it 
makes no difference whether additional public spending is 
financed by issuing bonds or by taxation. In that case a direct 
crowding out of private by public spending results. Although 
there exists no empirical evidence for Ricardian equlvalence in 
the Netherlands (see De Haan and Zelhorst, 1989) and the evidence 
for other countries on this issue is inconclusive, we have done 
some simple simulations on the policy of fiscal restraint in 
order to investigate how the assumption of Ricardian equivalence 
affects the working of the models. 
There are a number of ways to model Ricardian equivalence (see 
Leiderman and Bleijer, 1988). For our purposes Ricardian 
equivalence has been modelled in a very simple way, viz. by 
subtracting the real value of the financial deficit of the 
government partly or fully (depending on the value of the 
parameter r; eq. la) from disposable income. Hence the parameter 
r indicates the extent to which future tax payments are an-
ticipated in response to debt financing of public expenditure. 
In case of fuil Ricardian equivalence r is set equal to unity. Of 
course r is equal to zero in all simulations of this paper that 
do not assume Ricardian equivalence. 
The left hand side of table 4 gives the simulation results of a 
policy of reduction of government spending according to Mod CSM 
under f uil Ricardian equivalence. The table illustrates that 
under this assumption less government expenditure leads to more 
private consumption indeed. However, the quantitative effect 
appears to be rather limited, so that, even in the long run, 
hardly any positive effect on total income and employment 
results. 
The right hand side of table 4 gives the results of the expendi-
ture policy according to Mod CSM in which full Ricardian 
equivalence is combined with the high coëfficiënt values in the 
interest rate mechanism. This simulation finally shows the 
effects of the policy of fiscal restraint to turn from un-
favourable to favourable in the long run. In comparison to the 
other simulation results so far, the positive long run effects on 
total income and unemployment appear to be substantial. However, 
we mention again that the specification of this model is not in 
conformity with empirical evidence for the Netherlands. Moreover, 
the results appear to be rahter sensitive to specification 
changes in the equation for the demand for credit by the private 
sector (eq. 9j). This equation describes to what extent a 
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reductlon of the government deficit leade to more private sector 
borrowing. 
Table 4. The effects of au autonomous reductlon of government expenditure 
of 1Z of national income. 
(in X of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
according to Mod CSM Mod CSM 
(Ricardian (Rlc. equ., quadru-
equlvalence) pling Interest rate 
sens. coëfficients) 
after lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
Volume o£ income 
Volume of private consumption 
Volume of investments 
Price level 
Wage level 
Demand for labour 
Money stock (deflated) 
Unemployment (in lab. years xlOOO) 
Surplus current account (in ï NI) 
Fin. deficit government (in ï NI) 
Interest rate (ï-points) 
0.4 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.4 1.5 
0.5 1.1 1.4 1.8 0.5 1.5 2.6 5.1 
0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.4 2.0 4.3 9.2 
0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 1.0 
0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 1.4 3.3 
2 2 1 1 2 0 -4 -17 
0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.1 -0.6 -1.9 
1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.5 -1.0 -1.2 -1.6 -2.6 
0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.3 
6. Fiscal policv and non-accommodatine monetary policv. 
In contrast to the models mentioned at the end of section 4, the 
model of Knoester and Buitelaar (see, e.g. Buitelaar, 1988, 
tables 5.2 and 5.3) most clearly generates a turn from un-
favourable to favourable effects on total income and employment 
in case of a policy of fiscal restraint. The Knoester and 
Buitelaar model is a fully fledged third generation policy model 
for the Netherlands, although it is not used in actual policy 
analysis. It is, however, not the interest rate mechanism but the 
combination of the direct money transmission in the expenditure 
equations (eq. la and lb) and the supply determined modelling of 
this monetary transmission variable (in our case the broadly 
defined money stock, M2; eq. 11a and 11b) that causes this turn. 
Mod CSM determines M2 by a money demand equation, representing 
accommodating monetary policy. Under that assumption the 
expenditure policy leads to a fall in M2 as total expenditure 
decreases. In other words: there is no monetary ease which by way 
of direct money transmission partly offsets the fall in demand. 
In their model Knoester and Buitelaar describe the working of 
quite another mechanism. In terms of the structure of the models 
used here this mechanism is the following: the variable represen-
ting direct money transmission is determined by the sources of 
money supply (eq. 11a and 11b). 
The left hand side of table 5 shows the effects of an expenditure 
policy according to such modelling of monetary policy. Under the 
assumption of full capital market financing of the government 
deficit the relevant sources of money supply are the national 
liquidity surplus and net money-creating operations by banks. The 
latter source is assumed to be exogenous representing non 
accommodating monetary policy. As the expenditure policy leads to 
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a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments, the 
national liquidity surplus increases in spite of the fact that 
part of the surplus on the current account disappears abroad due 
to private sector foreign capital transactions. Hence, according 
to this version of Mod CSM, as shown in table 5, M2 rises in 
reaction to the expenditure policy. In that case direct money 
transmission indeed causes the effects of the expenditure policy 
on con8umption and investment to turn from negative to positive 
in the long run. However, the influence of direct money transmis-
sion, with a long term elasticity of 0.15, appears not to be 
large enough to make this mechanism lead to a turn in total 
expenditure through which employment rises as a result of the 
policy of reducing government expenditure. 
This is illustrated by the right hand side of table 5, which 
shows the simulation results of the policy of fiscal restraint 
according to a version of Mod CSM in which the money supply is 
determined by sources and in which the coefficients of direct 
money transmission in the consumption and investment functions 
are doubled. Hence this version of the model assumes a long term 
elasticity of direct money transmission of 0.3. Now, after six 
years in the simulation period, the effects of the fiscal policy 
of restraint on total income and employment appear to be slightly 
positive. 
Table 5. The effects of an autonomous reduction of government expenditure 
of 1Z of national income. 
(in X of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
according to Mod CSM 
(money supply 
af ter 
Volume of income 
Volume of private consumption 
Volume of investments 
Price level 
Wage level 
Demand for labour 
Money stock (deflated) 
ünemployment (in lab. years xlOOO) 
Surplus current account (in X NI) 
Fin. deficit government (in % NI) 
Interest rate (ï-points) I 
by sources) 
lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
-0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 
-0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.5 
-0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 
-0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
-0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 
-0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
0.3 1.0 2.2 3.5 
3 6 2 2 
0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 
-0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.4 
-0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Mod CSM 
(idem, doubling of 
coefficients of direct 
money transm.) 
lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
-0.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 
-0.5 0.0 0.6 1.0 
-0.7 0.3 0.5 1.1 
-0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
-0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.0 
-0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 
0.3 1.0 2.0 3.0 
3 S 0 -1 
0.7 0.7 0.4 0.1 
-0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.4 
-0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Hence, the question of whether such turn occurs remains an 
empirical one in this model, and largely depends on the size of 
the influence of direct money transmission on expenditure. It is, 
however, doubtful whether this way of modelling the monetary 
sector describes the actual situation in the Netherlands. It 
implies that the plea of the monetary authorities to reduce the 
government deficit would be directed at stimulating the inflow of 
money from abroad in order to enhance expenditure. It is most 
improbable that the Dutch monetary authorities in their support 
for the reduction of government expenditure, envisage such 
mechanism, the more so as the large current account surplus at 
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present already results in a considerable inflow of money from 
abroad. 
7. Monetary policv. 
Monetary policy in the Netherlands has traditionally been 
directed at controlling money growth. Although the link between 
monetary policy and employment has been the subject of some 
discussion (see Kessler, 1980) and although, at least in the 
sixties and the mid seventies, employment as a policy goal has 
played a major role in the timing of monetary policy (see Fase en 
Den Butter, 1977), monetary Instruments have never been con-
sidered to be very effective in labour market policy. In order to 
investigate this we have run a number of simulations with 
versions of the models in which the money stock is supply 
determined. Like in the previous section the money supply is 
modelled to stem from the usual three sources distinguished in 
Dutch monetary analysis: domestic credit, inflow of money from 
abroad and government liquidity creation (eq. 11a). All simula-
tions assume capital market financing of the government deficit 
so that there is no liquidity creation by the government. Inflow 
of money from abroad is endogenous and cannot be controlled by 
the central bank. Therefore, in conformity with the way monetary 
policy is actually conducted in the Netherlands, we have 
simulated a policy of monetary ease by an autonomous increase of 
net money creating operations. The simulations relate to an 
increase by 52 of national income in the first four quarters of 
the simulation period, which leads to a permanent autonomous rise 
of the nominal money supply of about 82. 
Table 6. The effects of an autonomous increase of net money-creating operations 
by 5Z Y over the period of one year. 
(in 2 of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
on according to , Mod CSM Ifcd CSM Mod CSM 
(money supply (idem, doubling (idem, doubling 
by sources) coëf. of direct dir.mon.tr . and lOx 
money transm 
.) price-effect) 
af ter lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
Volume of income 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 
Volume of private consumption 0.3 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.7 3.1 1.8 1.2 0.6 2.9 1.7 1.4 
Volume of investments 0.4 2.5 1.4 1.0 0.8 3.8 2.2 1.3 0.8 4.8 1.5 1.3 
Price level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.2 
Wage level 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 
Demand for labour 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Money stock (deflated) 2.1 7.5 5.6 4.3 2.0 7.1 4.5 2.7 2.0 6.8 4.8 3.2 
Unemployment (in lab. years xlOOO) -1 -6 -3 -6 -1 -11 -7 -12 -1 -12 -7 -10 
Surplus current account (in % NI) -0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.4 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 
Fin. deficit government (in X NI) -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
Interest rate (%-points) | -0.5 -0.6 -0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.0 -0.0 
The simulation results in the first part of table 6 for Mod CSM 
show that this impulse causes the money stock to rise by 7.5 2 in 
the first year of the simulation period. Thereafter the effect of 
the impul se on the money stock becomes smaller because the 
monetary impulse leads to a deficit on the current account and 
hence to outflow of money abroad. The simulation results for Mod 
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CSM indicate that the effects of this stimulative monetary policy 
on total expenditure and especially on employment are rather 
modest. This impulse does not result in a permanent reduction of 
the interest rate so that in this model direct money transmission 
is the main transmission channel of monetary policy. 
In order to illustrate this, the second part of table 6 gives 
simulation results according to a version of Mod CSM in which the 
coëfficiënt values of direct money transmission in the consump-
tion and investment functions are doubled and are set to a value 
which corresponds to a long term elasticity of 0.3. The simula-
tion results show that this specification change leads to effects 
on total expenditure and employment which are twice as high as 
veil. Because of the larger current account deficit the final 
endogenous effect on the money stock is smaller than in the 
Standard version of the model. 
The results of the first two simulations of table 6 show that the 
monetary impulse, according to these models, hardly affects the 
price Ievel. Thus these models contain no mechanism which makes 
money neutral in the long run. The influence of monetary policy 
on prices is modelled here through the utilization rate of the 
capital stock as determinant in the price equation (eq. 3a). 
Apparently the assumed influence, with a long run elasticity of 
0.2, is rather low. Therefore the third part of table 6 gives the 
simulation results according to a variant of Mod CSM in which the 
coëfficiënt value of this variable is multiplied by 10 and in 
which direct money transmission has again been set to a long term 
elasticity value of 0.3. Now we see that part of the monetary 
impulse leaks away to inflation and that therefore the stimula-
tive effect on total expenditure and on employment is somewhat 
mitigated. Yet the price effect is rather limited. It illustrates 
that policy models in which prices are explicitly modelled with 
cost factors as main determinants do not tend to describe money 
as neutral. 
8. Exchange rate policv. 
In the last decades exchange rate policy in the Netherlands has 
aimed at stable exchange rates. This is effectuated by linking 
the guilder to the German mark. In fact this option for a strong 
guilder has resulted in some appreciation of the guilder vis a 
vis the indexed values of the currencies of the main competitors 
of the Netherlands. There has been some debate whether this 
exchange rate policy would be beneficial to employment. The call 
for a more permissive exchange rate policy was especially strong 
at the end of the seventies when the trade balance was in deficit 
and the appreciation of the guilder had led to a substantial 
deterioration of the competitive position (for a survey of the 
debate: see Szasz, 1981). Nowadays, the balance of payments 
surplus and the strong competitive position leaves less argument 
for a devaluation. 
In order to investigate the effects of the exchange rate policy, 
we have simulated a once and for all increase of the exogenous 
exchange rate index by 10%. The results of this appreciation 
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according to Mod CSM are in the first part of table 7. We see 
that according to this model, the appreciation leads to less 
income because of the worsening of the competitive position. The 
fall in the volume of exports is matched by an almost equal fall 
in the volume of imports, vhich is due to the fall in demand and 
the decline of the utilization rate of capital goods. The 
appreciation and the better terms of trade result in a con-
siderable surplus on the current account in the first quarters of 
the simulation period. Because of a decline in labour costs and 
lagged effects in the price-vage spiral, employment rises in the 
second part of simulation period, so that in that period the 
positive influence of the lover labour costs on the labour 
market outweighs the negative influence of the fall in demand. 
The money stock in Mod CSM is demand determined vith income as 
scaling variable. Therefore neither the price deflation nor the 
inflow of money from abroad, vhich results from the trade balance 
surplus, lead to a higher real money stock. For that reason Mod 
CSM describes no wealth effects vhich vould compensate the income 
effects in the expenditure equations. In order to include these 
influences into the model ve have simulated the appreciation by 
means of a version of Mod CSM in vhich the money stock is 
determined by the sources of money supply. The results are in the 
second part of table 7. They show that nov the price deflation 
and the inflov of money from abroad lead to a considerable rise 
of the real money stock, especially in the second part of the 
simulation period. The appreciation is illustrated to lead to a 
rise, instead of a decline, of total income at the end of the 
simulation period. Hence, in that period the surplus on the 
trade balance turns into a deficit. 
Table 7. The effects of a policy induced appreciation of the exchange rate 
by 1GZ. 
(in Z of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
on according to Mod CSM Mod CSM Mod CSM Mod CSM 
(money supply (permanent apprecia- (money su pply by sour-
by sources) tion expectations) ces , perm. appr. 
expectations) 
af ter lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr lqu lyr 3yr 6yr 
Volume of income -2.7 -3.3 -1.0 -0.8 -2.5 -2.6 -0.1 0.5 -2.7 -3.2 -0.9 -0.8 -2.5 -2.3 0.6 2.1 
Volume of private consumption -2.9 -4.0 -1.4 -1.0 -2.4 -1.9 1.6 2.7 -2.9 -3.8 -1.3 -0.9 -2.2 -1.0 4.3 7.9 
Volume of investments -4.1 -6.3 -5.7 -2.4 -3.5 -3.6 -2.0 1.9 -4.1 -5.9 -5.4 -2.3 -3.3 -2.1 1.6 8.3 
Price level -1.2 -4.1 -8.0 -9.4 -1.2 -4.1 -7.9 -9.2 -1.2 -4.1 -8.0 -9.4 -1.2 -4.1 -7.8 -9.1 
Wage level -2.7 -7.9-10.3-10.5 -2.6 -7.5 -9.6 -9.6 -2.7 -7.8-10.2-10.5 -2.6 -7.4 -9.1 -8.4 
Demand for labour -0.3 -0.8 1.0 0.4 -0.3 -0.5 1.3 1.0 -0.3 -0.8 1.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 1.5 1.6 
Money stock (deflated) -0.6 0.2 0.5 -1.0 2.9 9.2 15.6 17.5 ,-0.4 0.5 0.9 -0.8 3.8 12.8 31.1 46.3 
Uneraployment (in lab. years xlOOO) 11 24 -27 -9 10 16 -36 -26 11 23 -27 -8 10 13 -40 -42 
Surplus current account (in Z NI) 3.9 2.9 2.0 0.6 3.8 2.0 0.6 -1.1 3.9 2.8 1.9 0.5 3.7 1.6 -0.8 -3.6 
Fin. deficit govemment (in Z NI) 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.8 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.8 0.8 0.9 0.0 -0.2 
Interest rate (Z-points) 1 0.7 -0.1 -0.0 0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -1.3 -0.8 
One of the ma in arguments for stable exchange rates and a strong 
guilder is that it reduces uncertainty and enhances credibility 
of monetary policy. These elements are not built into the models 
and probably are of a asymmetrical character. We tried to 
account for these reputation effects by assuming that the policy 
of appreciation vill lead to a permanent rise of exchange rates 
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expectations by 102. In technical terms: exchange rates expecta-
tions are made exogenous in the models (scrapping of eq. 9a and 
9b) and are given a permanent impulse of 10Z. The third part of 
table 7 shows the simulation results according to Mod CSM, in 
which the money stock is demand determined and the fourth part of 
table 7 shows the result for the version of Mod CSM in which the 
sources of money supply determine the money stock. In case of a 
demand determined money stock these reputation influences do not 
lead to big differences in outcome. This is shown by the compa-
rison of the first part of table 7 with the third part. However, 
in the case of a money supply determined money stock, the 
influence is substantial. The appreciation expectations result in 
a lower interest rate and in an increased inflow of capital from 
abroad. In combination with the balance of trade surplus this 
inflow of capital causes a very substantial rise of the real 
money stock. Thus, according to this model, the appreciation 
finally leads to a strong rise of total income and of employment 
in the last years of the simulation period. It must be noted that 
these simulations assume that the inflow of money and hence the 
rise of the liquidity ratio is not curbed by a restrictive 
monetary policy. 
9. Conclusions. 
This paper focusses on 
- the quantitative impact on economie activity and on the labour 
market of various forms of fiscal and monetary policy; 
- the extent to which this impact as measured by simulations with 
macroeconomic policy models is dependent upon model specifi-
cation and upon crucial parameter values. 
The simulation experiments of the paper show that 
- according to our stylized versions of the main-stream macro-
economie policy models fiscal and monetary policy is not very 
effective in enhancing total income and employment; as compared 
to other policy measures exchange rate policy is shown to yield 
relatively large effects; 
- the size and even the sign of the effects appears to depend 
strongly on the way the economy has been modelled; crucial 
parameter values are important in this respect, but more so the 
differences in model specification which mirror differences in 
interpretation and in theoretical thinking on how the economy 
works. 
The ma in remaining question is whether these conclusions imply 
that, in the Netherlands, there is no scope at all for fiscal and 
monetary labour market policy. The answer to this question is no, 
because it should be realized that the way in which fiscal and 
monetary policy can, at this moment, influence the labour market, 
is difficult to assess by empirical policy models and by theory 
based on observed economie behaviour. This has not much to do 
with the well known Lucas critique on the use of policy models, 
but with the fact that fiscal policy and, in particular, monetary 
policy has a strong conditioning character. Thus, in periods in 
which this policy has established its reputation by cautiously 
maintaining price stability and financial equilibrium between the 
various sectors of the economy, the fiscal and monetary autho-
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rities cannot do better for the labour market than to keep up 
with this policy. On the other hand, in case the authorities fail 
to maintain these balancing conditions, e.g. by allowing large 
financial deficits of the public sector or by a too permissive 
(or too tight) monetary policy, the resulting instability and 
loss of reputation may have serious repercussions for the labour 
market. In other words, a sound fiscal and monetary policy 
always is a necessary condition for a good functioning of the 
labour market, but can never be a sufficiënt condition and do the 
job all by itself. 
That is why traditional Dutch monetary analysis has focused much 
more on monetary conditions and on realizing internal and 
external equilibrium than on the scope for stimulating the 
economy by monetary impulses (see Holtrop, 1972). For that reason 
Ressler (1986) advocates to test the outcomes of causal policy 
models, as used in this paper, against the normative analysis of 
the monetary condition model. A synthesis between both lines of 
thought could be achieved by paying more attention to normative 
elements in the design of causal policy models, e.g. by regime 
switches in the case of a serious loss of reputation or by 
asymmetrie and ratchet effects. Another promising road in this 
respect is modelling of model (in)consistent expectations. Yet 
these elements are most difficult to build into the Dutch policy 
models as fiscal and monetary policy in this country has always 
been rather cautious. Therefore no observations are available on 
what happens in case monetary or fiscal conditions surpass their 
critical values. 
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ANNEX 
A. Equations. 
(1) Expenditure 
a. In c « const + 0.2 In c, + 0.64 In (yb-rFT0/p) -
0.3 In {(r+lOOW^+lOO)}^ + 0.12 In m2 
b. In i - const + 0.2 In ± + 0.8 In y - 1.2 In {(r+100)/(pe+100)}_1 
+ 0.12 In «2 - 1.6 In (w-p-ag+100) + 0.4 In qk 
gen -
j-o 
i.. 
" v o ' gea ' gem_]^' """w o _ ^ 
e. In b - const + 0.6 lnb . + 1.0 (In m,, - 0.6 In m,, .) + 0.8 In pm/pv 
f. In m » const + 0.6 In m , + 1.0 (In y - 0.6 In y
 1) - 0.3 In pn/pv 
+ 1.0 In qk 
g. n = 0.005 y 
h . y = c + i + i w o + g + b - m + n + y a u t 
(w/p) ( a + a o v ) 
i- yb - (y-ty) 
(w/p)_1 (a+aov)_1 
j - qk - y / y n 
(2) Money demand 
a. In m2 - const - 0.8 In tn2 . + 0.2 In y - 0.48 In (r+100) - 0.2 In (p+100) 
- 0.2 In qL + 0.48 In (rk+100) 
20 
(3) Wage and price formation 
a. In p - const + 0.8 In p . + 0.12 In w + 0.05 In qk - 0.16 In ag + 0.1 In t 
+ 0.08 In pn 
b . In v - const + 0.5 In w . + 0.5 In pv + 0.25 In qL + 0.5 In a 
+ 0.125 In t 
c . p - A In p x 100 
d. w - A In v x 100 
e . In pv - { l / ( l+m q )} In p + {mq/(l+mq)} In pm 
(4) Inflationary ezpectations 
a
- Pe " P-l 
b. w* " v 
(5) Labour demand 
(by quasi vintage approach) 
3 
a. a = const + a* - 0.5 ( 1 - \ 2 [y/ynt] .) a* 
j-O "J 
b. a* - 0.018
 { 1 + 0.5 (1-h)} k e-^ / 1 0° ..-0.01ï(c.£-l) 
c ynt - ynb • y/ybn 
d. y»» - (!/«) k
 e^'
/ 1 0
° 
e. k « k . + i - k„ 
-1 a 
f. ka - 0.015 (1 + 0.25 [y - 1.25]) caf k_x 
S- (w-p)gen - h S (w-p) . 
J-O "J 
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3 
h
- (r-Pe>ge« ~ k S (r-pe) . 
j-O *J 
(w-p)
 m -4JJ 
i. c.f - { 1 + 0.4 [ ]}{ 1- 0.0151 (r-pe)gein - (r-pe)0]} 
4p 
(6) Labour supply 
, + 0 . 5 In ap + 0 .15 In qL a. In a , » c o n s t + 0 . 5 In aa 
b . U • a, - a - a„„ 
a o v 
c . qL - 1 - U/aa 
y/(* + aov> - y . 4 / ( * + aov>_4 
d. ag - ag x { 1 + k [ ~ — ]} 
y _ 4 / <a + a o v > _ 4 
4 
e . si - A In a„ x 100 
g g 
f. yn - 0 .975 y n t 
( 7 ) Current account o f ba lance o f payments 
a
- Pm - e p b u 
b . M - pn .m 
c . B « p b 
d. LRt * B - M - Ds 
(8) Government budget restriction 
a. FT0 - p (g - ty) + Re + Gex 
(9) Sources of financial assets 
ê = 100 . (e - e_1) / e 
22 
b. èe - ê_1 
c . KV - c o n s t + 0 . 5 K V ^ + 0 .005 A ( r - r b u ) (B + M) - 0 .0016 è e (B + M) 
- 0 . 2 5 LRt 
d. NLO - LRt + KV + RVLR 
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e . rg - 1/20 E r . 
j -O " J 
f. Re - 0 . 9 5 Re_ 1 + r / 1 0 0 { 0 . 3 FT 0 _ 1 + 0 . 0 5 Re_ 1 1 0 0 / r g } 
g . LCC = r, FT0 
h . F(> - FT„ + NLO - KV = FT„ + LRr + RVLR 
p s o o t 
i . Y = py 
j . BKVnfi - c o n s t + 0 . 8 BKVnf! . + 0 . 5 AY - 0 . 1 F0n<! - 0 . 0 3 Ar Y 
" J p S P s—1 P s 
k . FA - FA , + BKV„B + FT + NLO 
- i p s o 
1 . M2 - p.m2 
m. NGB - AM2 - NLO - LC0 - OPSV 
n . fa - FA/p 
(10) Intereet rate 
a . r = c o n s t + 0 .15 p e + 0 .15 r k + 0 . 7 5 r b u + 0 . 1 ê e 
+ 0 . 2 5 (BKVps - NGB).100/Y + 0 .25 (FTo - LC o ) . 100 /Y 
(11) Sources of money supply 
a. M2 - M2_x + NGB + NLO + LC0 + OPSV 
b. m2 = M2/p 
23 
plus (9) a - k and n (NGB exogenous) 
B. Models. 
Mod CS : (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) + (6) + (7) + (8) 
Mod CSM : (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) + (6) + (7) + (8) + (9) + (10) 
Mod CSMs (money supply determlned by sources) : 
(1) + (3) + (4) + (5) + (6) + (7) + (8) + (10) + (11) 
24 
of svmbols. 
a labour demand by enterprises 
aa labour supply 
a labour productivity 
a labour productivity growth 
aov labour demand by government # 
a working age population # 
a* full capacity labour demand by enterprises 
B value of exports 
b volume of exports 
BKV gross domestic demand for credit by private sector 
c volume of private consumption 
e exchange rate index (1977=1); guilders in foreign currency .# 
ê exchange rate change 
êe expected exchange rate change 
FA value of private sector's domestic financial assets 
fa volume of private sector's domestic financial assets 
FO financial surplus of private sector 
FT0 financial deficit of government (on a cash basis) 
G value of government expenditure # 
g volume of government expenditure 
Gex residual net government expenditure # 
h index number of hours worked in enterprises (1970=1) # 
i volume of gross fixed investments (enterprises) 
iwo volume of gross investments in dwellings 
k volume of capital stock 
ka scrapping of capital stock 
KV net private sector foreign capital transactions 
LC0 government liquidity creation 
LRt current account of the balance of payments (on a transactions 
basis) 
M value of imports 
m volume of imports 
m„ world trade index (1977=100) # 
M2 value of broadly defined money stock 
m2 volume of broadly defined money stock 
m ratio of imports to income # 
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n 
NGB 
NLO 
OPSV 
P 
• 
P 
Pe 
Pbu 
Pm 
Pv 
Ik 
«U. 
r 
rbu 
Re 
rk 
RVLR 
t 
U 
w 
• 
w 
& 
Y 
y 
y t 
y/ybn 
yn 
ytlb 
ynt 
»? 
» 
V 
r 
volume of stockbuilding 
net money-creating operations 
national liquidity surplus 
net miscellaneoua items (residual source of money supply) # 
price index of gross national product (1977*1) 
rate of inflation 
inflationary expectations 
index of foreign prices (1977-1) # 
index of import prices (1977~1) 
expenditure price index 
utilization rate of capital stock 
utilization rate of labour 
(long term) interest rate 
long term foreign interest rate il 
interest payments of government 
short term interst rate # 
difference between current account on a cash and on a transactions 
basis # 
burden of taxation 
unemployment 
wage level 
wage inflation 
expected wage inflation 
value of (gross) national product 
volume of (gross) national product 
disposable income 
autonomous part of volume of (gross) national product # 
ratio of national product and production by enterprises il 
stuctural or natural level of income 
productive capacity of enterprises 
total productive capacity 
share of short term financing of government deficit # 
capital output ratio // 
labour saving technical progress # 
capital saving technical progress # 
tax anticipation rate of government deficit # 
Explanatory note: # indicates variables which are exogenous in all models. 
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